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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLISS S. ELMER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
A. H. MORTENSEN, d/b/a 
A. H. MORTENSEN PLUMBING 
& HEATING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10915 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injur-
ies received by the plaintiff in an accident that oc-
curred on April 3, 1964, during the construction of 
the Allen's Market in Springville, Utah. The de-
fendant's employee drove a truck over some concrete 
reinforcing wire on which plaintiff was standing. 
The wire caught on the truck and pulled the plain-
tiff's feet from under him resulting in injury to his 
back. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen with a jury and resulted in a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff for the total sum of $45,000. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant and defendant seeks reversal of the 
judgment below and a new trial, or in the alterna-
tive that the court reduce the judgment by the sum 
of $30,000, or in the alternative that the judgment 
be reduced by the sum of $19,450. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1964, plaintiff was employed by his 
brother, a general building contractor, and was the 
foreman in general charge of the construction of the 
Allen's Super Market in Springville, Utah. Defen-
dant, A. H. Mortensen, was the plumbing subcon-
tractor on said building ( T 28) . The building in 
question was 120 feet wide and 146 feet long (T 27, 
Ex 1). There was an entrance way to it on the east 
side that was approximately 15 to 20 feet in width 
(T 34, 108, 210). This entrance way was the only 
method of ingress and egress for trucks and other 
vehicles. The foundation wall ran the full width of 
the entrance and had a dirt ramp on either side of it 
approximately 12 to 14 feet wide (T 142), which 
was the main traveled portion for the trucks driving 
in and out of the building. There was a conflict in 
the testimony as to whether the foundation wall was 
completely covered with the dirt ramp or whether 
approximately three to four inches of the foundation 
wall extended above the dirt ramp. 
On the day of the accident the plaintiff and his 
crew of men were in the process of getting the con-
crete floors ready for pouring. The defendant, the 
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plumbing subcontractor, was in the process of get-
ting the underground plumbing installed. There was 
a conflict in the testimony as to whether there was 
a mud puddle on the outside of the building in front 
of the entrance way. The testimony varied from no 
mud or no water outside the building at all to a 
statement that there was a mud puddle beginning 
approximately three feet east of the entrance way 
and extending a distance of 8 to 10 feet in width. 
On the day of the accident, April 3, 1964, the 
defendant's son, Clyde Mortensen, who was acting 
as his fo1·eman, and two other employees, Douglas 
Poulsen and Lorin Davies, were in the building in 
the northwest portion of it doing their plumbing 
work. The plaintiff had four or five men on his 
cre\v. Among other things, they were preparing the 
floor for the concrete pour. At plaintiff's direction, 
his ln·other, Marion Elmer, was in the process of 
rolling out strips of steel reinforcing wire. The wire 
came in rolls 6 feet wide and approximately 200 feet 
in length. This was a mesh wire. Each roll weighed 
approximately 250 pounds (T 366, Ex 42). There 
were several rolls of this wire located approximately 
in the c e n t e i· of the building and in a line 
approximately even with the north portion of the 
entrance way. The plaintiff's brother would roll 
this wire out in strips of approximately 32 feet long. 
He would cut the wire and then roll the wire back 
to the west end where he would cut it again and 
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would thus keep rolling the wire laying one layer 
of wire on top of another. This wire was rather 
springy and it would tend to curl up on the ends a 
distance of 12 to 16 inches. Plaintiff's brother put 
some kind of a timber on the west end of the wire 
he had rolled out, and he also put timber on the east 
end to help hold it down. The east encl of the wire 
was located approximately three or four feet west 
of the east wall of the building ( T 33, 34). There 
were four lengths of wire rolled out, and they were 
stacked one on top of the other. These were 32 feet 
long and 6 feet wide. The four pieces of wire were 
located right in the entrance way. There was some 
difference in testimony as to how far the north edge 
of the 'vi re was from the north portion of the en-
trance way. The testimony would indicate it \Vas 
far enough from the north entrance way so a man 
could walk in and out, which would be about three 
feet ( T 121). 
Clyde Mortensen, the defendant's foreman and 
son, told the defendant's employee, Doug Poulsen, 
to take their pickup truck, which was then inside 
the building, and go down to their shop and pick up 
some kind of a plumbing part. Poulsen got in the 
truck and droYe it from where it had been parked 
somewhere in the northwest portion of the building 
down on the south side of the lengths of wire that 
were in the entrance way. As he approached the 
wire in the entrance way, the plaintiff saw him com-
ing and motioned for him to stop. Poulsen stopped 
the truck about 30 feet from the east wall of the 
building and about 10 feet south of the wire (T 
121). At this time, the four pieces of wire were 
about 2 or 3 inches high, but on the ends the wire 
was curled up 12 to 14 inches (T 35). There was 
a 4 x 4 about 16 inches from the east end of the 
wire holding it down (T 37). The plaintiff picked 
up a 2 x 4 that was about 6 feet long. He stood on 
the wil'e and within a foot of the north edge. (See 
Ex 1 and the words written in pencil "Position of 
Mr. Elmer when standing on wire" T 97). The 
plain tiff was standing on the wire and was holding 
the east end down with the 2 x 4 because he antici-
pated that the wire might catch on the truck (T 103, 
116). 
After plaintiff stepped on the wire on the north 
edge thereof and after placing his 6 foot 2 x 4 on 
the southeast portion of the wire, he said to Poul-
sen, "Okay, come over it slow." Poulsen then pro-
ceded to drive out of the building. There is a con-
flict in the testimony as to what happened at this 
point. The plaintiff's witnesses testified that Poul-
sen revved his engine and gunned the truck out of 
the building. Poulsen denied this and said that he 
just eased forward until he got to the point where 
his truck was going out of the building and that he 
then just accelerated slightly to get over the founda-
tion wall, which was sticking above the dirt ramp, 
and to get through the mud puddle that was outside 
the building ( T 239). The wire caught on the left 
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rear fender of the truck. This pulled plaintiff's feet 
from under him, causing him to land on his back 
and resulting in injuries that ultimately required 
the fusion of the lumbosacral portion of his spine. 
The plaintiff claimed total medical expenses at 
the time of trial of $2,4 73.50 ( T 65) and loss of 
earnings as of the time of trial of $10,550.00 (T 
64). 
Plaintiff introduced evidence that indicated he 
was earning $7,000 per year for the three years 
prior to the accident (T 65, Ex 7) and that after 
he finally returned to work, he was only able to earn 
the sum of $4,800 per year. The plaintiff's evidence 
stated most favorably to the plaintiff was to the 
effect that he suffered a 30 per cent loss of bodily 
function, that his condition was permanent, and 
that he would probably not be able to do any carpen-
try work again in the future. He was 53 years of 
age at the time of trial. There was a conflict in the 
medical testimony as to the amount of disability and 
as to whether the plaintiff could do carpentry work 
in the future. 
Plaintiff admitted that he could have gotten a 
longer stick with which to hold the wire down and 
would not have had to stand on it at all (T 106). 
Plaintiff readily admitted that the wire could have 
been rolled out in such a position so that it would 
not have been in the entrance way at all ( T 90, 91). 
He also admitted that he could have told his men to 
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pull the wire to the west where it would have been 
completely out of the entrance way before the truck 
drove out ( T 93). The wire had been in the en-
trance way about 30 to 45 minutes before the acci-
dent (T 53). 
The case was tried to a jury on March 13, 14 
and 15, 1967. The jury returned a verdict in the fol-
lowing form: 
General Damages ------------$12,500 
Special Damages ____________ 2,500 
Loss of Earnings ____________ 30,000 
Judgment on the verdict was entered March 16, 
1967 (R 73, 74). Defendant filed a Motion for 
New Trial and a Motion to Alter and Amend (R 
75, 77). The Order denying the Motions for New 
Trial and to Alter and Amend the judgment was 
entered April 19, 1967 (R 84). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
PERTAINING TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF WERE PREJU-
DICIALLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT: 
(A) THE INSTRUCTIONS (PARTICULARLY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11) DEPRIVED DEFEN-
DANT OF RELYING ON THE FACT THAT 
PLAINTIFF STOOD ON THE WIRE WHILE 
THE TRUCK WAS DRIVEN OVER IT AS A 
GROUND OF NEGLIGENCE; AND, 
(B) THE (b) PART OF INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
REQUIRES THAT THE JURY FIND IN THE 
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CONJUNCTIVE BOTH FAILURE TO MAIN-
TAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT AND A FAILURE 
TO EXERCISE DUE CARE, WHEREAS THE 
JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT 
EITHER IMPROPER LOOKOUT OR LACK OF 
DUE CARE WAS SUFFICIENT. 
The pre-trial order provides as follows: (R 15) 
2. The specific acts of contributory neg-
ligence which the defendant claims the plain-
tiff committed in proximately contributing to 
or causing the accident are as follows: 
a. In failing to remove the wire from 
the entrance of the building. 
b. In failing to maintain proper lookout. 
c. In standing upon the wire as the 
truck was driven over it. 
d. In failing to exercise due care. 
The court's Instruction No. 2 in general tells 
the jury what the parties' respective claims are. 
Instruction No. 2 (R 39) as it pertains to the claim 
of defendant reads: 
The defendant denies that his employee 
drove the truck negligently, and claims that 
the injuries, if any, suffered by plaintiff, 
were caused by his own negligence in failing 
to remove the reinforcing wire from the en-
trance to the building, in failing to maintain 
a proper lookout, and in failing to exercise 
due care for his own safety in that he stood 
on the wire while the truck passed over it. 
Instruction No. 3 ( R 40) refers to Instruction 
No. 2, and states, 
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The preceding instruction is not to be 
considered by you as a statement upon the 
part of the court as to what facts are, or are 
not, proved in this case, but such instruction 
is a mere recital and statement to you as to 
what the respective parties in the case claim 
to be the facts. 
Instruction No. 10 ( R 43) tells the jury the 
grounds of negligence claimed by the plaintiff. In-
struction No. 11 (R 44 and the one under attack) 
tells the jury the grounds of contributory negligence 
relied upon by the defendant. Instruction No. 11 
reads in part as follows : 
Before contributory negligence would 
preclude plaintiff's recovery, you must find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that 
each of the two following propositions are 
true: 
Proposition No. 1: That the plaintiff was 
negligent in one or more of the following par-
ticulars: 
(a) In that he failed to remove the reinforc-
ing wire from the entrance to the build-
ing before allowing the truck driven by 
Douglas Dwayne Poulsen to proceed. 
(b) In that he failed to maintain a proper 
lookout and exercise due care for his own 
safety. 
Proposition No. 2: That the said negli-
gence of the plaintiff, if any, was a proximate 
and contributing cause of the occurrence. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 10 re-
quested that the court instruct the jury relative to 
plaintiff's claimed grounds of negligence on the part 
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of defendant and it further provided that in order 
for plaintiff to recover, that the jury must find that 
plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. De-
fendant's requested Instructions No. 11 and 12, 
further amplified the claims of negligence and of 
contributory negligence. 
The court, in Instruction No. 2, in effect, tells 
the jury that defendant is claiming plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent because he stood on the wire 
while the truck was driven over it. Instruction No. 
11 restricts defendant to two grounds of contribu-
tory negligence and in effect tells the jury that 
standing on the wire while the truck was driven 
over it, as a matter of law, would not be sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent. The vice of this 
instruction is that it removed completely from the 
consideration of the jury one of the principal 
grounds of defense relied upon by defendant. All 
the way through the trial of the case, defendant was 
constantly attempting to point up to the jury that 
plain tiff did not act reasonably in standing on the 
wire when the truck was driven over it. For the 
court to then tell the jury in effect that standing on 
the wire while the truck was driven over it could not 
be considered by the jury as negligence on the part 
of plaintiff was to deprive defendant of one of the 
main grounds of defense and was to deprive defen-
dant of a fair trial. 
Trial courts will frequently instruct the jury 
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in general terms on the defense of contributory neg-
ligence which then leaves the defendant in position 
to argue any and all of the grounds of contributory 
negligence that are supported by the evidence. Such 
a method of instructing on the issue of contributory 
negligence is an accepted one and is commonly used. 
When the court, however, undertakes to spell out in 
detail the various grounds of contributory negli-
gence relied upon by defendant, it has a duty to in-
struct fully on all of the grounds urged by the de-
fendant that find reasonable support in the evi-
dence. In other words, each party is entitled to have 
his case submitted to the jury on any and all theories 
justified by the admissible evidence. To deprive eith-
er party of a full presentation of his claims, is to 
deprive that party of his day in court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt on numer-
ous occasions with the principle that each party is 
entitled to have his theory of the case fully present-
ed to the jury and that anything less is prejudicial 
error. 
In Morrison vs. Perry, 140 P. 2d 772, 104 Ut. 
151, the court dealt with a situation where the de-
cedent was driving north and the defendant south. 
As the two vehicles approached, the decedent drove 
on the left side of the highway or on defendant's 
side. The defendant then pulled to the left of center 
of the highway and applied his brakes. At about the 
same time the decedent turned back to the right 
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and the collision occurred on the decedent's side of 
the roadway. 
The court failed to instruct the jury in accor-
dance with the defendant's theory of the deceased's 
contributory negligence, which was supported by 
the evidence. On appeal, the court held that this was 
error and in so doing said: 
Defendant's theory, which was supported 
by evidence was that deceased, by driving on 
his left-hand side of the highway and his fail-
ure to turn to his right side in time to avoid 
creating an emergency, did create an emer-
gency, which confronted defendant, through 
no fa ult of his. The court failed to properly 
separate the theories of the parties, but in-
stead gave general instructions treating the 
rights and duties of each driver as being mu-
tual, without regard to defendant's theory as 
to deceased's negligence in first being on his 
wrong side of the highway. Defendant is en-
titled to have his case submitted to the jury 
on any theory justified by proper evidence. 
Each party is entitled to have his theory 
of the case presented in such a way as to aid 
the jury and not confuse it. 
In applying the rule of this case to the case now 
before this court, the defendant, Mortensen, was en-
titled to have the jury consider, among other things, 
the fact that plaintiff did stand on the wire while 
the truck was being driven over it as a ground of 
contributory negligence. The defense was completely 
taken away from the jury and the jury was in ef-
fect told that although defendant claims the fact 
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of standing on the wire while the truck was driven 
over it was negligence, this could not be considered 
by the jury as sufficient ground on which to find 
negligence on the part of plaintiff. 
In Beckstrom vs. Williams, 282 P 2d 309, 3 Ut. 
2d 210, the Utah court held it was prejudicial error 
for the trial court to ref use to submit the case to the 
jury on plaintiff's theory of last clear chance where 
the evidence would support such a theory. The court, 
in so holding, reaffirmed the general rule, that eith-
er party has a right to have his theory of the case 
submitted to the jury if evidence would justify rea-
sonable men in following that theory. To the same 
effect, see Lund vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 
351 P 2d 952, 10 Ut. 2d 276. See also Startin vs. 
Madsen, 237 P 2d 834, 120 Ut. 631, where the Su-
preme Court held that the trial court has a duty to 
cover the theories of both parties in its instructions; 
McDonald vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 167 
P 2d 685, 109 Ut. 493. In Webb vs. Snow, 132 P 2d 
114, 102 Ut. 435, the court was dealing with an 
action for assault and battery arising out of an al-
tercation with persons operating a "giant racer" 
at a recreational resort, where evidence with regard 
to commencement of the altercation was conflicting. 
The trial court, which had given instructions assum-
ing that facts were as testified to by plaintiff's wit-
nesses, erred in refusing instructions presenting de-
fendant's theory of the case. The court reaffirmed 
the rule that a party is entitled to have his theory 
13 
submitted to the jury, when there is evidence to 
sustain it. 
In Hooper vs. General Motors Corporation, 260 
P 2d 549, 123 Ut. 515, the Supreme Court again 
had the opportunity of dealing with an erroneous 
instruction. In this case, the plaintiff was driving a 
Chevrolet truck. The truck overturned injuring 
plaintiff. After the accident, the rim was separated 
from the spider, the spider being the spokes and in-
side of the wheel that bolts to the axle. It was claim-
ed by the plaintiff that the wheel was defective at 
the time of manufacture. There were worn spots on 
the underside of the rim indicating that there had 
been looseness for some time prior to the ultimate 
failure of the wheel. There were also other facts and 
circumstances tending to show that the wheel was 
defective at the time it was put on the truck. The 
court instructed the jury as follows: 
You are instructed that the fact that the 
rim and spider were found in a separated con-
dition after the accident is no evidence of the 
fact that they were defective, unsound, or 
unsafe when assembled and sold by defen-
dant, General Motors Corporation, nor is it 
evidence of the fact that the separating of the 
rim and spider caused the truck to go out of 
control and overturn. 
'The court reversed and granted a new trial. In 
so doing, the Supreme Court in effect held that the 
trial court, by giving the above instruction, singled 
out one of plaintiff's pieces of evidence that when 
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considered with other evidence, tended to show de-
fective manufacture, and the instruction told the 
jury that this piece of evidence; namely, the fact of 
spider-rim separation, was no evidence at all of eith-
defective manufacture or that the failure of the 
wheel caused the accident. In holding the instruc-
tion erroneous, the Supreme Court said: 
It is not enough to say, that though the 
instruction be incorrect, the fact of rim-spid-
er separation was so implicit in all of the evi-
dence, that no prejudice resulted to the plain-
tiff. The instruction as given, withdrew from 
the jury a fact which was some evidence of 
two requisite elements of the plaintiff's cause. 
It would be pure conjecture to say that the 
jury ignored the instruction. 
Applying the ruling of the Hooper case to the 
case now before this court, the effect of the trial 
court's instruction was to take completely from the 
jury defendant's claim that plaintiff was negligent 
in standing on the wire while the truck was driven 
over it. Had the jury been permitted to consider that 
claim as negligence on the part of plaintiff, the re-
sult of this lawsuit would very probably have been 
different. 
For numerous other cases announcing the rule 
that the trial court has the duty to fully instruct 
the jury upon every reasonable theory of the parties 
which finds support in the pleadings and evidence, 
see Cook vs. Saltzer, 257 P 2d 228, 7 4 Ida. 97; 
Wurm vs. Pulice, 353 P 2d 1071, 82 Ida. 359; Lem-
15 
man vs. McManus, 233 P 2d 410, 71 Ida. 467. In 
Phillips vs. G. L. Truman Excavation Company, 
362 P 2d 33, 55 Cal. 2d 801, the trial court submit-
ted the case to the jury on the question of defen-
dant's negligence only, but refused to submit it on 
the question of the contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia reversed, holding that there was some evidence 
of contributory negligence and hence the defendant 
was entitled to have his theory of the case submitted 
to the jury. In so holding, the court said: 
It is hornbook law that each party to a 
lawsuit is entitled to have the jury instructed 
on all of his theories of the case that are sup-
ported by the pleadings and the evidence. It 
is incumbent upon the trial court to instruct 
on all vital issues involved * * *. A trial court, 
where there is evidence to support such a de-
fense, may not, by refusing to instruct on it, 
deprive a party of this defense. If it does, the 
error in refusing to instruct on it is obviously 
prejudicial in any case where the evidence 
admitted in support of the defense, if be-
lieved, would support a verdict in favor of the 
complaining party. 
In Daniels vs. City and Coimty of San Fran-
cisco, 255 P. 785, (Cal.) the trial court did not in-
struct the jury on the theory of last clear chance. 
The Supreme Court held the evidence would sup-
port a finding in favor of the plaintiff on that 
theory and the failure of the trial coure to so in-
struct was prejudicial error. 
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The general rule is stated in 88 CJS Section 
301, Page 18 as follows: 
Where a case or a defense is based on 
more than one theory, the jury should be 
instructed on all of them, * * * .. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Taylor vs. 
Hays, 261 P 2d 599, dealt with the same problem 
where it held that a trial court owes the duty on 
its own motion, to instruct the jury on all funda-
mental issues. To the same effect, see Atchison, To-
peka and Santa Fe Railroad Company vs. Hicks, 
258 P 2d 208, (Oklahoma) where the court held that 
it is the duty of the trial court on its own motion to 
pl'opedy instruct the jury upon decisive issues made 
there by the pleadings and evidence introduced at 
trial and failure to do so constitutes fundamental 
error. 
Rivisto vs. Heller, 2 N. Y. Supp. 2d 288, in-
volved an auto-pedestrian accident. The pedestrian-
plaintiff claimed the defendant was guilty of speed-
ing and failure to sound his horn. From a judgment 
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed 
claiming that the charge of the trial court to the 
jury that if " the defendant did what a reasonable 
prudent person would do when he saw the plaintiff 
step out of a stopped car to avoid the accident, the 
Yerdict must be for the defendant," was error. The 
appellate court held this instruction was prejudici-
ally erroneous because it had the effect of eliminat-
ing all alleged acts of negligence prior to the time 
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the defendant saw the plaintiff, including the 
grounds of speeding and failure to warn. 
Cmnillo Cotton Compcrny rs. Cou:ley, 183 S\\-
134, 52 Ga. App. 268 in,·oked a case whe1·e the de-
fendant claimed the plaintiff was negligent because 
of ( 1) speeding and ( 2) improper passing. On ap-
peal from a judgment in faYor of plaintiff, it was 
held that the trial judge's failure to instruct on the 
issue of imprope1· passing was prejudicial error, 
even though the judge did allude to this issue in his 
review of the claims of the defendant. The court in 
reversing the trial court said : 
It is the duty of the court to giYe in the 
charge to the jury the law applicable tu the 
issues made by the pleadings and the e\·i-
dence, and his failure to do so when injurious 
to the losing party is re\·ersible error * * *. It 
is not enough for the court to gi\·e in the 
charge the contentions of the parties, but he 
must also giYe the law applicable * * *. 
In Chandle1· i·s. Kmnff, 73 NE 2d -190, 117 Ind. 
App. 538 the defendant's car became disabled at 
night on a highway. The plaintiff recei\·ed injuries 
when he ran into the rear of the disabled Yehicle. 
He claimed the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in ( 1) stopping his automobile on the main trawled 
portion of the roadway and ( 2) in failing to set out 
proper warning de\ices around his disabled Yehicle. 
The trial court instructed the jury only on the sec-
ond ground and in effect eliminated the first 
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gl'Ound as a basis for recovery. The verdict was in 
favor of the defendant. On appeal, the court held 
the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on 
the issues presented by the pleadings and evidence 
whether requested to do so or not, and a failure to 
do so constitutes prejudicial error. The court said 
'\Ve believe the trial court committeed prejudicial 
errnr in failing to instruct the jury on the issue of 
speed, which was pleaded in the plaintiff's amend-
ed petition. No other instructions given by the trial 
com·t properly cove1· this issue.' 
Abercronibie vs. Roof, 64 Ohio App. 365 in-
volves a malpractice case where the doctor allegedly 
injected alcohol instead of an anesthetic prior to the 
operation and then followed that with several acts 
of negligence resulting in the decomposition of the 
plaintiff's flesh and a subsequent long hospitaliz-
ation. Three distinct issues of negligence were pre-
sented to the jury by the pleadings and evidence: 
( 1) negligence in the pre-operative technique in the 
administration of the local anesthetic; ( 2) negli-
gence during the operation in failing to heed the 
protestations of the plaintiff that he was suffering 
undue pain; and ( 3) negligence in post-operative 
treatment. In its charge to the jury the court in ef-
fect read the pleadings, or at least summarized 
them, but when instructing on the specific grounds 
of negligence, he only covered the first one dealing 
with the pre-operative injection of alcohol instead 
of anesthetic. On appeal from a judgment in favor 
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of the defendant, the court held this was prejudicial 
error in spite of the fact that the plaintiff at no time 
requested the charge on the other two grounds of 
negligence. The court in this case in reversing the 
trial court said : 
The defendant claims that all this 
charge does is to r~quire a preponderance of 
the evidence in proving alcohol was injected 
into the plaintiff. This is not the limit of the 
natural and logical inference from the lang-
uage used nor did the jury undoubtedly so 
consider it. It is a mandate upon the plaintiff. 
The natural inference, though not expressed 
in terms, is that if the plaintiff fails to com-
ply with this mandate, he fails in his case. Of 
course, the charge as far as it goes states a 
correct proposition of law, but it is inappli-
cable to the facts in the case and is mislead-
ing especially in view of the failure of the 
court to properly charge upon all the issues 
in the case. 
In Sewell vs. Macre, 323 P 2d 236, 52 Wash. 2d 
103 the court said: 
One of the appellant's theories upon 
which he based his right to recovery was that 
the respondent's violation of the above quored 
portion of the ordinance was the proxima~e 
cause of his injury. The law in this regard is 
not covered by any other instruction. It is re-
versible error to fail to instruct the jury prop-
erly upon an issue which is pleaded and sup-
ported by the evidence. 
In Riser vs. Herr, 102 P 2d 178, 187 Okl. 211, 
the court said : 
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Upon the foregoing considerations we 
con~lude that th~ trial court erred in failing 
to mstruct the JUry as to which of the two 
vehicles had the right of way if they found 
that one of them entered the intersection be-
fo_re the other * * *. It is the duty of the court 
without a request and upon its own initiative 
to instruct the jury upon all the vital factors 
of the tenable legal theories of both litigants 
concerning the issues of fact. 
See also Roadway Express vs. Baty, 144 P 2d 935, 
189 Okl; Clay vs. Texas Arizona Motor Freight, 159 
P 2d 317, 49 New Mex. 157; Harrinton vs. Fortman, 
8 NW 2d 713, 233 Ia. 92; Meschini vs. Guy F. At-
kinson Company, 325 P 2d 213, 160 Cal. App. 2d 
609. 
In the case now before this court, not only did 
the court on its own motion give an instruction, the 
effect of which was to take from the jury the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff was negligent because 
he stood on the wire when the truck was driven over 
it, but the instruction went further and informed 
the jury that a failure on the part of the plaintiff 
to maintain a proper lookout in and of itself would 
not be sufficient on which to predicate a finding of 
contributory negligence. This is clearly erroneous. 
Failure to maintain a proper lookout on the part of 
the plaintiff was clearly sufficient in and of itself 
as a basis for finding the plaintiff negligent with-
out requiring the jury to in addition to improper 
lookout find that the plaintiff was guilty of a lack 
of due care. Instruction No. 11 tells the jury it must 
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find that the plaintiff was guilty of failure to main-
tain a prope1· lookout, as well as doing something in 
addition, which would constitute a failure to exer-
cise due care for his own safety. The instruction as 
given leaves with the jm·y as a basis for finding con-
tributory negligence, a failm·e to remove the wire 
completely from the entrance to the building, or 
impropc1· lookout plus failure to exercise due care 
It takes away completely from the jury the standing 
on the wire while the truck was driven over it and 
it requires improper lookout plus lack of due can, 
instead of permitting each; i.e., standing on thl' 
wire, improper lookout, 01· lack of due care to be a 
sufficient basis for finding negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff. This seriously prejudiced defendant. 
A reading of the record will demonstrate that 
defendant relied heavily, during the trial of the case, 
on his claim that the plaintiff was not acting rea-
sonably when he stood on the wire while the truck 
was driven over it. To be deprived of relying on 
this defense was to effectively deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial. 
POINT II. 
A. LOSS OF EARNINGS FROM THE TIME OF 
ACCIDENT TO THE TIME OF TRIAL IS AN 
ITEM OF GENERAL DAMAGE AND WAS IN-
CLUDED EY THE .JURY IN THE AWARD FOR 
GENERAL DAMAGES. 
E. IN THE EVE~T, THE COURT TAKES THE 
POSITION THAT LOSS OF EARNINGS FROM 
THE TIME OF ACCIDENT TO THE TIME OF 
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TRIAL IS AN ITEM OF SPECIAL DAMAGES, 
LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS OR IMPAIR-
MENT OF EARNING CAPACITY CLEARLY 
ATIE PART OF THE GENERAL DAMAGE 
AW ARD AND TO PERMIT THE JURY TO 
l\1AKE AN AW ARD FOR GENERAL DAM-
AGES AS WELL AS FOR LOSS OF FUTURE 
F.AHt;JNGS IS TO PERMIT A DOUBLE RE-
COVERY FOR THE SAME ITEM OF DAMAGE 
The jury after finding the issues in favor of 
the plaintiff assessed plaintiff's damages as follows: 
General damages ____________ $12,500 
Special damages ______________ 2,500 
Loss of earnings ____________ 30,000 
Plaintiff claimed medical expenses at the time of 
µre-Ll·ial and at the time of trial of $2,473.50 (T 
65) and loss of earnings from date of accident to 
time of trial of $10,550.00. 
Therr is a difference of opinion among the trial 
bPnrh and bar of this state as to whether loss of 
earnings from date of accident to date of trial is an 
item of special damages or to be included in the 
general damage award. Some of the judges treat 
luss of earnings down to the time of trial as an item 
of special damage and permit the jury to find spe-
cially as to that item. Others treat loss of earnings 
to the date of trial as general damages and require 
the jury to include that loss as part of the general 
damage award. None of the trial judges in this state, 
in this writer's experience, treat loss of future earn-
ings or impairment of earning capacity as an item 
of special damage, but all of them require that the 
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jury include loss of future earnings or impairment 
of earning capacity in the general damage award. 
There seems to be no dispute or difference of opin-
ion at all as to this either among the trial bench or 
the bar. 
It would be most helpful to the trial courts and 
the bar of this state if this court would settle once 
and for all the question of whether or not loss of 
earnings to the date of trial is an item of special 
damage or whether it is to be included and deemed 
a part of the general damage award. It would also 
be helpful to the trial bench and bar if this court 
would affirm the uniform practice that has been in 
effect in this state for many years of treating loss 
of future earnings or impairment of earning capac-
ity as general damages and requiring the jury to 
include the same in the general damage award. 
This court has had occasion in the past to deal 
with the question of whether loss of earnings to the 
time of trial was an item of special damage or to be 
included in the general damage award. There does 
not seem to be a clear-cut ruling by our court on this 
question. 
In Littledike vs. Wood, 255 P 172, 69 Ut. 323, 
the question was involved as to whether loss of earn-
ings past and future, could be recovered without 
specially pleading these i terns. The court, dealing 
with this question said: 
On the question of damages, the court 
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charged the jury that they had the right and 
sh?uld ~~ke i~to consideration among ~ther 
thmgs, the time lost and that he will prob-
ably hereafter lose, if any, as may appear 
from the evidence, by reason of and as the 
result of said injury." The point made is that 
there were no allegations or proof of loss of 
time or of earnings or of any impairment of 
earning capacity. It is claimed that such e!e-
ment is special damage and hence is required 
to be specially pleaded, which was not done; 
and if not special not recoverable, under the 
description of the injury and the general ad 
damnum clause, that there was no evidence 
upon which to base a finding of any damage 
or loss in such regard. The matter was not 
specially pleaded. The injury, in the com-
plaint, is described as follows: That the ap-
pellant struck the plaintiff in the mouth with 
his fist and knocked two of his front teeth 
out and loosened a great many more, cut his 
lower Ii p and knocked him down, struck him 
over the eye, kicked or struck him in the side 
and broke three ribs, which punctured the left 
lung, and that as a result of the beating, the 
respondent was forced to go to the hospital 
and remain there several weeks, and was 
greatly damaged in body and in mind and suf-
fered pain, etec., and that he was permanent-
ly injured. 
The Supreme Court then said: 
If loss of time or of earnings or impair-
ment or earning capacity naturally and neces-
sarily results from the injuri~s which 3:re de-
scribed and of the act complamed of, evidence 
can be given of such loss without specially 
pleading it. 
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The court then refers to the description of the 
injury contained in the complaint and said: 
Such a description of injury shows some 
loss of ~iI?e as a natural and necessary result 
of the mJury as alleged. Hence to entitle re. 
spondent to recover for loss of time it was 
not essential that such loss be furthe~ or spe-
cially pleaded. 
The court seems to hold in this case that loss of 
earnings, both past and future are general damages 
and may be recovered without specially pleading 
them if the description of the injury is such that 
it may be inferred as a natural consequence, that 
there would be some loss of time. 
In Clawson vs. Walgreen Drug Company, 162 P 
2d 759, 108 Ut. 577, the Supreme Court again had 
the problem before it as to whether or not loss of 
earnings was an i tern of special or general damages. 
In dealing with this question, the court said: 
It is objected that loss of time should 1 
have been specifically pleaded before evidence 
on it was admissible. This assignment in- ' 
volves the same basic problem as that raised 
by the assignment that the court improperly 
permitted the jury to consider "loss of time" 
and "impairment of earning capacity" as ele-
ments of damage. The assignments may be 
discussed together. At the outset, it should 
be noted that a distinction is made between 
loss of earnings and impairment of earning 
capacity. The former relates to the loss of 1 
wages which might have been earned had the 
plaintiff not been injured. The latter relates 
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to the diminution of earning capacity. The 
measure of damages for the former may in 
general terms be stated as the amount the 
injured person might reasonably have earned 
in pursuit of his ordinary occupation. The 
measure of damages for the latter in general 
terms is the difference between the amount 
which plaintiff was capable of earning before 
his injury and that which he was capable of 
earning thereafter. Some jurisdictions hold 
that before recovery can be had for loss of 
wages, the loss must be specifically pleaded. 
The court then goes on to discuss the holding in 
the Li ttledike case and said : 
Under the holding of the Littledike case, 
supra, this is a sufficient allegation, when 
taken with the allegations concerning the na-
ture of his injuries, to warrant the introduc-
tion of evidence relative to impairment of 
earning capacity. In the absence of special de-
murrer, it is also probably sufficient to per-
mit evidence as to loss of earnings, although 
it would have been better if specifically plead. 
ed. 
InPauly vs. McCarthy, 184 P 2d 123, 109 Ut. 
431, the Supreme Court again had occasion to dis-
cuss the Li ttledike case and the Clawson case. In 
this case, annuity and mortality tables were admit-
ted in evidence over the objection of the defendant. 
The court then said : 
The basis of defendant's objection is that 
there was no allegation or claim of permanent 
injuries, and therefore the table ~n this c!lse 
was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, 
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;;ind would tend to mislead and confuse the 
JUry. 
The court then talks about the cases and ob-
serves that they are in conflict on the question of 
whether the permanence of injury must be alleged 
in order to allow recovery therefor. The court goes 
on to say: 
The cases in which the problem has been 
presented fall into three groups: ( 1) Appar-
ently, the majority rule is that damages for 
the permanency of the injury are recoverable 
under a general allegation for damages, with-
out specifically alleging the fact of perman-
ency. In many of the cases, this rule is ex-
pressly stated; and other cases have allowed 
1 
recovery of damages for permanent injuries 
in the absence of any specific allegation that 
the injuries complained of were permanent. 
( 2) Other cases take the view that dam-
ages for permanent injuries may not be re-
covered under a general allegation of dam-
ages, without specifically pleading the fact of 
permanency. These cases go on the theory that 
damages for such injuries are in the nature 
of special damages, which must be specific-
ally pleaded to allow recovery therefor. How-
ever, under this view, the word "permanent" 
need not be used in alleging the permanency 
of the damages. Any equivalent expressions 
are sufficient. Thus, an allegation that t~e 
plaintiff will be disabled for the rest of his 
life has been held a sufficient allegation of 
permanence. Lakeshore Railroad Company vs. 
Ward, 135 Ill. 511, 26 NE 520. Nor is it nec-
essary that permanency be positively pleade.d 
as a determined and ascertained fact. It is 
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sufficient to say that the plaintiff, "believes" 
his injuries are permanent, or that they "may 
be" permanent or that they "probably" will 
be permanent. 
(3) A third line of authorities holds 
that unless facts from which the permanency 
of the injury will necessarily be implied, are 
alleged, there must be a special averment that 
the injuries are permanent, in order to let in 
proof to that effect. This is really a qualifica-
tion of the second rule. Under this rule, the 
fact that permancy may possibly or even prob-
ably follow from the nature of the injury is 
not sufficient to allow recovery therefor in 
the absence of a specific allegation of per-
manency. 
The question as to which of the above 
three rules should be adopted in this jurisdic-
tion seems never to have been decided by this 
court. However, in the case of Littledike vs. 
Wood,, 69 Utah 323, 255 P 172, we said: "If 
loss of time or of earnings or impairment of 
earning capacity naturally and necessarily 
results from the injuries which are described 
and of the act com plained of, evidence can be 
given of such loss without specially pleading 
it." 
This rule was laid down in Atwood vs. 
Utah Light and Railroad Company, 44 Utah 
366, 140 P 137 and was followed in Clawson 
vs. Walgreen Drug Company, 108 Utah 577, 
162 P 2d 759. If we were to follow the reason-
ing of these cases, Utah would probably fol-
low the third rule. However, we do not think 
it is necessary to determine that question, at 
this time. We believe that the plaintiff's com-
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plaint sufficiently alleged the permanance of 
the injury. 
The court then goes on to say: 
As pointed out supra, the purpose of re-
quiring the plaintiff to allege the perman-
ence of his injuries ( in those jurisdictions 
which require such an averment) is to give 
notice to the defendant of the nature and ex-
tent of the claim, so that he may properly pre-
pare his defense and not be taken by surprise. 
Therefore, any language which puts the de-
fendant on notice that plaintiff claims dam-
ages for the permanence of his injuries is 
sufficient. 
The court held that the complaint adequately 
put defendant on notice that the injuries claimed 
were permanent and therefore held that it was prop-
er to admit the mortality and annuity tables. 
The Clawson case, as well as the Pauly case, 
cite Littledike with approval. Littledike, in effect, 
held that if the description of the injuries in the 
complaint would indicate that loss of time or of earn-
ings or impairment of earning capacity would na-
turally result from those injuries, evidence could 
be given of the loss without specially pleading. It 
would seem that the Utah court, while not coming 
out specifically and saying so, has in effect held that 
loss of earnings sustained from the time of accident 
to the time of trial, as well as future loss of earn-
ings or impairment of earning capacity, are items 
of general damage and not special damage and 
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therefore would be included in the general damage 
award. 
Oregon has had occasion to deal with the ques-
tion of whether loss of earnings to the time of trial 
is special or general and as to whether or not loss of 
earnings or impairment of earning capacity are to 
be considered part of the general damages. In Shaw 
vs. Pacific Supply Cooperative, 113 P 2d 627, 166 
Ore. 508, in dealing with this question, the Oregon 
Supreme Court said: 
Impaired earning capacity differs from 
loss of earnings. The latter looks to the past, 
must be specially pleaded and the amount of 
the loss ordinarily is capable of fairly definite 
ascertainment. The former is a direct and 
natural consequence of a disabling injury and 
therefore, comes under the head of general 
damages which need not be specially alleged. 
It is concerned with "what a man would be 
able to earn in the future and his capacity to 
make good." 
In Moe vs. Alsop, 216 P 2d 686, 189 Ore. 59, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon again made a distinc-
tion between loss of earnings from time of accident 
to time of trial and for loss of earnings or impair-
ment of earning capacity in the future. In dealing 
with this question, the court observed that the plain-
tiff had demanded, besides general damages for 
permanent injuries, special damage of $532.00 for 
loss of earnings. The defendant moved to strike the 
drmand for these special damages and the motion 
was denied. The court then said. 
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It is true that recovery may not be had 
for both loss of earnings and diminished earn-
ing capacity covering the same period of time. 
The special damages claimed in this connec-
tion, however, covered only loss of time for a 
period of seven weeks prior to the commence-
ment of the action. This was a proper claim 
and was not included within the claim fo; 
general damages. 
Oregon again dealt with this problem in the 
case of Lehr vs. Gresham Berry Growers, 372 P 2d 
488, 231 Ore. 202. The court in dealing with the 
problem of loss of earnings and impairment of earn-
ing capacity, said: 
Loss of earnings and profit must be 
pleaded and must be proven by evidence from 
which this loss may, within reasonable limits, 
be ascertained. Loss of future earnings, on 
the other hand, is a natural consequence of a 
disabling injury and therefore comes under 
the head of general damages. 
The Oregon Supreme Court, again in the case 
of Fields vs. Fields, 326 P 2d 451, 213 Ore. 522, 
dealt with the problem of loss of earnings in the past 
as distinguished from impaired earning capacity in 
the future. The court said: 
As pointed out in Shaw vs. Pacific Sup-
ply Co-op, 113 P 2d 627, 166 Ore. 508, there 
is a well defined difference between impaired 
earning capacity and loss of earnings. Im-
paired earning capacity is a direct and na-
tural consequence of a disabling injury of a 
permanent or lasting nature. It is an element 
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of general damages and need not be specially 
pleaded. On the other hand, loss of earnings 
generally looks to the past and is an element 
of special damages, must be specially pleaded 
and ordinarily may be ascertained with rea-
sonable certainty. 
It would be improper to permit recovery 
for loss of earnings and for impaired earn-
ing capacity covering the same period of time. 
See Moe vs. Alsop 216 P 2d 686, 189 Ore. 59. 
Loss of earnings ordinarily compensates for 
loss sustained during the period from the 
injury to the commencement or trial of the 
action. If recovery is sought for both loss of 
earnings and impaired earning capacity, then 
the latter should be assessed prospectively 
from the time of trial. See McCormick on 
Damages, Hornbook Edition, Section 86. 
The court in Gersick vs. Schilling, 218 P 2d 
583, 97 Cal. App. 2d 641, said: 
The claim for loss of earnings, no matter 
how pleaded, is an i tern of general damages. 
Swanson vs. Bogatin, 308 P 2d 918, 149 Cal. 
2d 755 was a personal injury action in which the 
court instructed the jury that it could return special 
chm ages consisting of ( 1) medical expenses; and 
(2) loss of wages to the time of trial. It also in-
structed the jury that it could return a verdict for 
general damages. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff for the sum of $15,000 general damages 
and $5,170.45 special damages. The special damage 
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award included some $3,000 for loss of wages. On 
appeal, the defendant claimed it was error to per-
mit loss of wages to be considered as a special item 
of damage. The court, on appeal, held that permit-
ting the jury to find specially for lost wages down 
to the time of trial was all right. In so doing, the 
court said: 
They say that no part of a loss of wages 
could be considered as special damages. 
Again, we think they are in error. Impair-
ment of earning capacity, which is an element 
of general damages, is not the same as actual, 
proved, loss of wages, between the occurrence 
of the injury and the trial; if loss of wages 
dudng that period is alleged and can be prov-
ed with reasonable certainty, the damages can 
be recovered as special damages. 
In Wilson vs. Sorge, 97 NW 2d 477, 256 Minn. 
125, the court held that recovery for loss of or dim-
inution of power to earn in the future is general 
damages. 
Kentucky has dealt with the problem of double 
recovery in the case of McCellan vs. Trelkeld, 129 
SW 2d 977, 279 Ky. 144. In dealing with this prob-
lem the court said : 
Instruction No. 3 also authorized the 
jury to find for the plaintiff a sum which rea· 
sonably and fairly represents loss of time for 
three months not to exceed $400 per month or 
a total of not more than $1,200 in addition to 
his loss of power to earn money. 
The Instruction as a whole authorized 
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the jury to find for the plaintiff both for 
permanent impairment of his power to earn 
money and for the loss of time for the same 
period, to the extent of the lost time thereby 
authorizing a duplication for the period of 
the lost time. This was error. The recovery 
for loss of power to earn money begins when 
the loss of time ends. Upon another trial of 
the case if a similar instruction be given, it 
should be so framed so as to avoid the dupli-
cation we have indicated. 
InSingles vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
112 NW 2d 752, 173 Neb. 91, the plaintiff recovered 
a verdict of $100,000. The defendant on appeal 
claimed there was a double recovery allowed for 
loss of earnings and for loss of earning capacity 
covering the same period of time. The Supreme 
Court of Nebraska in reversing the lower court for 
permitting a double recovery said: 
It is the contention of the defendant 
that the cited portion of the instruction per-
mits a recovery for the impairment of the ca-
pacity of the plaintiff to earn money in the 
future and for the loss of time in the future 
and thereby authorizes the jury to allow a 
double recovery. 
The fore going paragraph of Instruction 
No. 9 permits a recovery for the following 
i terns of damage : ( 1) pain and suffering sus-
tained to the time of trial, (2) impairment of 
capacity to earn in the future, ( 3) reasonable 
value of time lost to time of trial, ( 4) future 
pain and suffering, and ( 5) loss of time in 
the future. It seems clear to us that a litigant 
may not recover for the impairment of earn-
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ing capacity and time lost in the future for 
the same period of time. It permits the jury 
to allow a double recovery. 
The controlling rule is stated in 14 Am. 
Jur., Damages, Section 89, Page 55 as fol-
lows: 
"It has been held that a recovery cannot 
be had both for loss of time and for dimin-
ished earning capacity during the same per-
iod and that an allowance for permanent im-
pairment of earning capacity should run only 
from the expiration of t1i:e period covered bv 
an allowance to damages for lost time." · 
We point out that the instruction under 
consideration as to future loss of time was in 
addition to any allowance for damages for the 
impairment of plaintiff's capacity to earn 
money in the future as indicated by the words 
of the instruction you should also allow him 
reasonable compensation for the future loss 
of time. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court then said: 
It is the duty of the trial court, without 
request, to instruct the jury as to the proper 
measure of damages in a personal injury case. 
If the instruction on the measure of damages 
is erroneous, a litigant is not precluded from 
asserting error because of a failure to tender 
a proper instruction. Where instructions ai~e 
so framed as to mislead the jury into a dupli-
cation of an element of recovery or into an 
award of damages twice for the same loss, 
such instruction is prejudicially erroneous. 
In the case now before this court, the trial court 
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in Instruction No. 16 (R 48) permitted the jury to 
make an award for loss of earnings and it also per-
mitted the jury to make an award for loss of future 
earnings. The instruction states: 
You may also consider the matter of 
loss of future earnings and award him the 
ptesent value of such loss, if any, as you be-
lieve from a preponderance of the evidence he 
is reasonably certain to suffer in the future 
as a result of the injury in question. 
Instruction 16 then goes on to say: 
In awarding such damages you may con-
sider the nature and extent of the injuries 
sustained by him, the degree and character 
of his suffering, both mental and physical, its 
probable duration and severity, and the ex-
tent to which he has been prevented from pur-
suing the ordinary affairs of life as hereto-
fore enjoyed by him and disability or loss of 
earning capacity resulting from such injury. 
In asmuch as the total loss of earnings claimed 
to the time of trial amounted to the sum of $10,550 
(T 62), it is clear-cut that of the $30,000 loss of 
earnings awarded by the jury $19,450 of that 
amount of necessity had to be for future loss of 
earnings. In addition there was a $12,500 award for 
general damages which under the court's instruc-
, tions would include an award for permanent loss of 
earning capacity. In effect the jury made a double 
award. It made an award for loss of future earnings 
and also made an award for impairment of earning 
capacity. This double recovery is prohibited under 
37 
the law and has been struck down by the Supreme 
Court of every state having occasion to deal with 
the problem. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of 
Ready vs. Hafenian, 300 NW 480, 239 Wis. 1 re-
fused to permit a jury verdict to stand that included 
a double recovery for future loss of earnings and 
impairment of earning capacity. 
Under all of the cases cited above, loss of future 
earnings or impairment of earning capacity are 
items that go to make up the general damage award. 
To permit the jury in this case to make an award of 
$12,500 general damages and also to make an ad-
mitted award of at least $19,450 for future loss of 
earnings is certainly to permit a duplication and a 
double recovery. 
In dealing with the problem the Texas court 
had the following to say in International GNR Com-
pany vs. Startz, 82 SW 1071, 37 C 51: 
We do not hold that it was improper for 
the court to instruct the jury that they might 
consider the items of damages referred to or 
any other i terns of damage disclosed by the 
testimony and award damages therefore: but 
when a general measure of damages is stated, 
it is improper to so frame a charge as to a11th-
orize an additional recovery for particular 
items of damage that are included in and cov-
ered by the general measure of dmnages. 
The Texas court again had occasion to deal 
with the double damage problem in the case of In· 
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ternational Great Northern Railroad Company vs. 
King, 41 SW 2d 234. The trial court allowed the 
jury to give separate compensation for five items of 
damage. In its verdict the jury awarded separate 
damages for these items as follows: ( 1) $20,000 
for bodily injury, (2) $2,000 for mental anguish, 
(3) $2,500 for loss of earnings, ( 4) $12,000 for loss 
of earning capacity after trial, and ( 5) $2,000 for 
medical expenses, totaling $38,500. The appellate 
court in reversing the lower court said : 
The rule is well recognized in this state 
that it is improper to authorize a jury to 
assess double damages for the same loss or 
injury and an issue or an instruction is erron-
eous if it authorizes or permits a double re-
covery. 
It is equally well settled that if an issue 
or instruction submitted is calculated to con-
fuse or mislead the jury into assessing double 
damages by inducing them to consider separ-
ately things which properly constitute but one 
element of recovery, it is erroneous. 
After reveiwing the many authorities on double re-
covery, the court continued: 
Furthermore, the items submitted separ-
ately as was done, undoubtedly was calculated 
to confuse and mislead the jury and caused 
them to render different sums than they 
would have rendered if only one item was to 
be answered. 
The court in conclusion said: 
The issue submitted was erroneous m 
39 
that it permitted the jury to make answer 
to each item submitted which permitted the 
plaintiff to recover double damages. It was a 
positive erroneous issue in that it was clearlv 
misleading and confusing to the jury by in-
ducing them to consider separately items 
which properly constituted but one element 
of recovery. 
The Texas appellate court in Brown Cracker 
and Candy Company vs. Castle, 26 W 2d 435 revers-
ed a trial court for permitting a double recovery and 
in so doing said : 
The following portion of said charge, 
"Together with loss of time, if any, up to the 
present, together with loss of time, if any, in 
the future, together with the destruction, if 
any, and reduction, if any, of his capacity to 
labor and earn money, so resulting directly 
and proximately," while not requiring the 
jury to find a double measure of recovery was 
permissive for that purpose, in that, in addi-
tion to taking in account any loss of time, the 
charge permitted the jury to take in to ac-
count, as part of the damages that would be 
suffered in the future, the destruction, if any, 
or reduction, if any, of appellee's capacity to 
labor and earn money, which would be includ-
ed within the element of recovery allowed for 
the loss of time in the future. The giving of 
such charge was correctly condemned by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Missouri Kand 
T Railroad Company of Texas vs. Beesley, 
106 Tex. 160, 155 s"r 183, 160 SW 471. 
There are numerous California cases holding 
that loss of earnings are to be considered items of 
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general damage. See Edminster vs. Thorpe, 226 P 
2d 373, 101 C. A. 2d 756; Gersick vs. Shilling, 218 
p 2d 583, 97 C. A. 2d 218. 
The Utah cases seem to pretty clearly indicate 
that loss of earnings from the time of the accident 
to the time of trail is to be considered as part of the 
general damage a ward. It is obvious from a reading 
of the Oregon cases and the California cases, that 
those two jurisdictions have adopted a different rule 
and treat loss of wages from the time of the accident 
to the time of trial as special damages, whereas, loss 
of future earnings or impairment of earning capac-
ity are considered items of general damages. We 
have found no case in any jurisdiction that permits 
treating the loss of future earnings or impairment of 
earning capacity as a special item of damage and 
that permits the jury to fix future loss of earnings 
specifically. 
If the Littledike and Clawson cases are follow-
ed to thir logical conclusions, then loss of earnings 
from time of accident to time of trial, as well as 
future loss of earnings or impairment of earning 
capacity are to be treated as general damages. This 
being so, the jury did make an award for general 
damages and the court should strike from the judg-
ment the entire loss of earnings award in the 
amount of $30,000. 
Even if the court takes the position that loss of 
earnings from time of accident to time of trial is to 
be treated as a special item of damage, it is clear 
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from all the authorities that future loss of earnings 
or impairment of earning capacity constitutes gen-
eral damages and are included in the general dam. 
age award. All appellate courts having occasion to 
deal with the problem take the definite position that 
future loss of earnings or impairment of earning 
capacity must be treated as items of general dam-
age. Under the evidence in the case now before this 
court, the total amount of lost wages claimed from 
time of accident until the time of trial was the sum 
of $10,550. The balance of the award for loss of 
earnings of necessity is for future loss of earnings 
or future impairment of earning capacity and would 
be included in the award for general damages. It is 
improper to permit ret.::overy for loss of earnings and 
for impaired earning capacity covering the same 
period of time. The Oregon Supreme Court has stat-
ed this in no uncertain terms in Fields vs. Fields, 
supra, where it said: 
It would be improper to permit recowry 
for loss of earnings and for impaired earning 
capacity covering the same period of time. 
The court in ill oc vs. Alsop, supra, said: 
It is true that recovery may not be had 
for both loss of earnings and diminished earn-
ing capacity covering the same period of time. 
To permit the judgment to stand in this case is 
to permit the jury to make a double award for the 
future loss of earnings and impairment of earning 
capacity. This the jury may not do, and it is respect-
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fully submitted that the court, if it refuses to strike 
the entire award for loss of earnings made by the 
jury from the judgment, the least it should do is 
strike the amount of the loss of earnings award from 
the judgment that has to do with loss of earnings 
for the future. In other words, the least amount that 
should be stricken is the sum of $19,450. 
POINT III 
IT WAS ERROR TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO 
REDUCE FUTURE DAMAGES TO PRESENT 
WORTH WITHOUT STATING A FORMULA 
OR RULE BY WHICH THE JURY COULD 
MAKE THE COMPUTATION. 
The court, in Instruction No. 16, informed the 
jury that it could consider the matter of loss of fu-
ture earnings and could award the plaintiff the pre-
sent value of such loss but the court did not, in any 
instruction, go further and advise the jury as to 
how it could make the computation or could compute 
the present value. Instruction No. 90.34 and 90.35 
in JIFU spells out the formula by which future 
damages may be reduced to present worth. The 
plaintiff further failed to introduce any evidence 
from which such a computation could be made. 
In Hays vs. New York Central Railroad Com-
pany, 67 NE 2d 215, 328 Ill. Appeals 631, it was 
held error to instruct the jury to reduce prospective 
damages to present worth without stating a form-
ula or rule by which the jury could make the com-
putation. 
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In lVentz vs. T. E. Connally, Inc. 273 P 2d 485 
45 \V ash. 2d 12 7, it was held that it was reversibl~ 
error for the trial court, before whom the case was 
tried, without the intervention of a jury, to fail to 
reduce an award for impaired earning capacity to 
its present worth. 
CO~CL "CSIO~S 
Defendant should be granted a new trial be-
cause under the court's instructions on contributory 
negligence, defendant was deprived of ha,ing his 
theories of defense submitted to the jury. To, in 
effect, tell the jury that it may not consider the fact 
that plaintiff stood on the wire while the truck was 
being driven over it, as a basis for finding plaintiff 
guilty of negligence, was to deprive defendant of 
one of his basic defenses in the case. 
Instruction No. 11 as gi\-en by the court fur-
ther combines improper lookout and failure to ex-
ercise due care in the conjunctive. This, in sub-
stance, tells the jury that failure to maintain a 
proper lookout in and of itself would not be sufficient 
on which to predicate a finding of contributory neg-
ligence. This is clearly eroneous. Failure to main-
tain a proper lookout was clearly sufficient in and 
of itself as a basis for finding the plaintiff negligent 
without requiring the jury to also find lack of due 
care. The instruction further tells the jury it must 
find that the plaintiff was guilty of failure to main-
tain a proper lookout as well as doing something, in 
addition, which would constitute a failure to exer-
cise due care for his own safety. We submit that 
this is an erroneous statement of the law and clearly 
prejudiced the defendant. The instruction as given 
leaves with the jury as a basis for finding contribu-
tory negligence, the failure to remove the wire 
completely from the entrance to the building, or im-
proper lookout plus failure to exercise due care. It 
takes away completely standing on the wire while 
the truck was driven over it and it requires improp-
er lookout plus lack of due care instead of permit-
ting each; i.e., standing on the wire, improper look-
out, or lack of due care, to be a sufficient basis for 
finding negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
The defendant's motion for a new trial should 
be granted because the damages are excessive and 
appear to have been given as a result of passion or 
prejudice. 
If the court refuses to give a new trial, then de-
fendant urges the court to grant his motion to alter 
and amend the judgment by striking from it the 
$30,000 award for loss of earnings on the grounds 
that loss of earnings, both past and future, are 
items of general damage and would be included in 
the general damage award made by the jury. If the 
court refuses to treat loss of earnings both past and 
future, as general damages, then defendant urges 
that the court treat the loss of wages from the time 
of accident to time of trial as special damages and 
all future loss of wages as general damages and 
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that the court strike from the judgment the sum of 
$19.450, which represents the minimum amount 
awarded by the jury for future loss of earnings. 
The special damages claimed to have been in-
curred to the date of trial for medical expenses 
amounted to the sum of $2,473.50 and the court 
should alter and amend the judgment by reducing 
it to the actual amount of special damages claimed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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